My name is Dale Baranoski. I grew up in a small town called Edgewater Park, NJ where my father was Chief of Police and by all accounts, a damn good one. I chose to follow in his footsteps. In 1986 I became a police officer for Westampton Township Police Department. In 1990 I was promoted to sergeant. Thereafter my squads and I led the police department in all areas of productivity while maintaining few, if any citizen complaints! Indeed, the officers in my squad as well as myself, even as a sergeant, had work performance records far superior to other squads combined! Sadly, being a good cop is not enough. Indeed, it can be a liability! But I like to think that I was chosen, in part, for my personal and professional intergrity and attributes so that first, I would survive, and secondly, bring to justice those who have degraded the legal system for their own ends and advantages.

This site will reveal rampant criminal conduct originating out of the Burlington County Prosecutors Office (AKA: the Burlington County Persecutor's Office). Evidence and facts will demonstrate that this disorganized crime ring enlisted the aid of several local police departments and dates from the present to back to 1995. The list of victims involves both civilian and police officers in what can be termed localized terrorism.

"If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his case, it follows that he can choose his defendants. Therein is the most dangerous power of the prosecutor: that he will pick people that he thinks he should get, rather than cases that need to be prosecuted. With the law books filled with a great assortment of crimes, a prosecutor stands a fair chance of finding at least a technical violation of some act on the part of almost anyone. In such a case, it is not a question of discovering the commission of a crime and then looking for the man who has committed it, it is a question of picking the man and then searching the law books, or putting investigators to work, to pin some offense on him. It is in this realm--in which the prosecutor picks some person whom he dislikes or desires to embarrass, or selects some group of unpopular persons and then looks for an offense, that the greatest danger of abuse of prosecuting power lies. It is here that law enforcement becomes personal, and the real crime becomes that of being unpopular with the predominant or governing group, being attached to the wrong political views, or being personally obnoxious to or in the way of the prosecutor himself."

These words were uttered nearly six decades ago by Robert Jackson, who went on to an illustrious career as a Supreme Court justice and an American prosecutor at the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal. At the time, he was President Franklin Roosevelt's attorney general. He was addressing the ordinary federal prosecutors under his command. He was alluding to tactics that have since become common, practiced with a boldness that grows as judges communicate ever more clearly that they will neither supervise prosecutions (as they once did) nor remedy prosecutorial misconduct.

Why has this site been created? Because sometimes it becomes necessary to shame the law into action. Every conceivable law enforcement agency has been provided the opportunity to take action and all have failed, most from intent. Also, all media sources were repeatedly contacted and asked to help expose what was happening to try to prevent any more victims. They too refused. Some reporters admitted that outside pressure was being applied to make sure no stories were being published, so powerful has this corruption become. Politicians, police unions (FOP and PBA), Governmental agencies both at the State and Federal level, and even the ACLU were all contacted and requested to provide aid, in any form. All refused. A list of those, who through act or omission, failed to render aid, are listed on the Hall of Shame. While none of the inept culprits have the courage to publicly challenge or threaten this victim, what they may do under the cover of darkness is another matter. Therefore, as I expose the crimes, I also raise the threat level. If you think the movie "Serpico" revealed major corruption, hold onto your seats for this one!

I am only one, but I am one. I cannot do everything, but I can do something. And because I cannot do everything, I will not refuse to do the something that I can do. What I can do, I should do. And what I should do, by the grace of God, I will do.
- Edward Everett Hale

Sometimes all it takes is one man to step and do the right thing. In my battle against this corruption, I have never shirked my responsibility to combat crime. Never has my integrity or honesty been impeached. After having exhausted all remedies to bring those responsible to justice, I have elected in exposing them, and a legal system in decay that allows such criminality to be managed through it.

Dale

The Drunk Driver

This story needs to be told to lay the foundation for how the second matter came to be. Some critics would claim that this incident was the first sign of a cop gone bad, referring to myself. But cops like me can't go bad, it goes against our nature. One friend and fellow police officer gave me one of the highest compliments I have ever gotten. He told me that good cops learn to be such, but great cops are born. He said I was born to be a great cop.

This first attack against me offers a glimpse into the way a system, even one involving law enforcement, goes bad. It is about good cops going bad, and bad cops becoming worse. I am not the first, nor sadly will I be the last such victim. The facts of this case will show how some police officers when given the opportunity would be willing to break the law to take out a fellow police officer for personal retaliation; or to eliminate professional rivalry for advancement. Having demonstrated this, it will be easier, although perhaps more sinister, to make the facts of the second incident easier to assimilate.

1997: Discord was rising within my police department (Westampton Township, NJ) due to poor Administration from an inept Chief. Moral could not become any lower. My squad and I chose to ignore the internal politics and concentrated on just doing our job. However, once the Chief issued an illegal order to stop performing our sworn and oath-bound patrol duties and we refused to comply with the order, we found ourselves to be the target of what I have coined "cop on cop crime." We began to be harassed and ridiculed for working, not only from above, but also from other officers who felt we were "making them look bad." As I said then, only they could make themselves look bad. In essence this was a two-pronged attack; retaliation from a jaded police chief who imagined conspiracies against his position due to his incompetence and a professional elimination by Internal Affairs Officer Sergeant Reed of a rival and a far superior patrol sergeant, yours truly. Sgt. Reed obtained his promotion only through the good graces of the department's police union. We felt bad that he could not pass the sergeants test (Reed could only obtain a 69 wherein a 70 was the passing score). Indeed, he was only promoted because of support from the then-Police Association and to assume the position of Detective-Sergeant, an obsolete and non-sought after position. The idea being that such an uncoveted position would allow Reed to obtain a position that would have been otherwise unattainable to him. Since all the current road sergeants, although their work records might have been lacking, were sufficiently intelligent enough to warrant passing whatever promotional testing that might come, Reed would need to eliminate the competition. He started with the top choice first, me. He began by following through on a drunk driver's attempt to escape justice by filing a false allegation of police abuse after his arrest, a not uncommon trick and one which the suspect used before in another jurisdiction.

As a police officer I always maintained high work ethics and morals. I always operated on the premise that I would do my job to my utmost. This is reflected by my early promotion to sergeant after just four years as a patrolman. It was my simple idea that the best way to judge a worker is by his work record. When I became sergeant I added to this work style of leading by example. My squads always led the police department in almost all areas of productivity, i.e., 70% of the total drunk driving arrests, 50% of the total drug arrests. Even as a road sergeant, only my own men came close to my own work performance. Conversely, crime always seemed to happen on the "other squads" and not ours, or at the least, was considerably lower on our watch. This is testament to the diligence we applied in being proactive. We didn't just do the glory details, we also made sure people and things were safe within our borders. My last squad and I always volunteered for nightshift and so remained together, also in part because the non-workers did not want to be assigned to a working squad. Its called a paycheck and we thought it should be earned. Go figure.

South Jersey Justice

What can be done? What can you do?

So what can you do? Remember, all evil needs to succeed is for good men to stand aside and do nothing. Do something, anything. Write to you local politicians, all who I have made sure were made aware of this demented regime that preys upon the innocent at the expense of the publics safety to protect those who deserve no protection.

If you are a law enforcement officer, feel free to share this site with your Union or Lodge. Demand they contact their State Lodge or even Nation level Lodge or Union. Demand that they speak up and take action. It may be you next that falls into disfavor for no reason other than someone wants to be promoted or has a vendetta. When cops prey on cops, everyone loses and everyone can be the next victim. As you can see on the Hall of Shame, both the FOP and the PBA Presidents care more for politics than they do for the rank and file.

If you are a civilian and/or law enforcement, here are some links to find your legislatures:

Office of the Acting Governor - Never responded
P.O. Box 001
Trenton, NJ 08625-0001
609-292-6000

http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/districts/njmap210.html

Board of Chosen Freeholders - Refused to act
County Office Building
49 Rancocas Rd.
Mt. Holly, NJ 08060
Phone: 609-265-5020
Fax: 609-265-5022
Email: freeholders@co.burlington.nj.us

You can contact the owners of Burlington County's hometown paper, the Burlington County Times and ask why the Editor of that paper won't do the story Here is what I wrote to them:

Calkins Media
8400 Route 13
Levittown, PA 19055

To Whom It May Concern:

Some time ago I called your organization to express concern about potential local politics interfering with the local newspaper the Burlington County Times (which is owned by Calkins Media). I was concerned that after several years of failed attempts, a story which is assuredly newsworthy, as well as viable for all the right reasons – financial, newsworthiness, community service, was not being told by the Burlington County Times (BCT). Hence, I decided to go to the source.
When I made the call the Calkins Media, I was not sure what kind of reception I would receive. I was pleasantly surprised when the person who answered the phone spoke was highly receptive to hearing my complaint. I explained that I had serious doubts that such a story should not be published, and my misgivings as to the involvement of local politics. I mentioned that if Calkins Media was aware of this as a whole, and simply agreed with the views of the local Editor(s) at BCT to not do the story, then I would accept that. However, based upon my training, experience with the media, and especially with the BCT, which I grew up with reading and delivering that the decision by BCT to not do the story was perplexing.
I expressed to the person who answered (whose name I did not get) that it was my belief that perhaps influences were involved that was obstructing the news process. After all, if "bad cops" are always newsworthy, then it would stand to reason that news of law enforcement officials at a higher level "gone bad" would be even more exceptional. When one of the accused is a County Prosecutor who was involved in the infamous NJ Trooper shooting incident and who had been accused, by a Superior Court Judge, of prosecutorial misconduct in that matter, it was nonsensical why nothing was being told. That case received National attention due the issue of racial profiling. This factor, combined with the blatant and repetitive nature of the criminal conduct by this same Prosecutor, and his Office, surely is significant. At the conclusion of the phone conversation, I was told that the matter would be reviewed and if warranted, I would be contacted.

Thereafter, Editor Ron Martin of the BCT called me. While it was clear that he was not pleased with my call to Calkins Media, he and I spoke about the story. It was clear to me that Mr. Martin had several preconceived and completely erroneous misunderstandings as to the matter. After providing some background and assurances as to the availability of the evidence and facts in support of the story, Mr. Martin agreed to E-mail me so that I could send him information to help tell the story in a more factual way. The information was sent.

After some time passed and no reply was received from Mr. Martin, I sent a follow-up E-mail. He responded in a most peculiar way. He advised that what I had sent was "opinion" and not fact. I was surprised. The material sent was on file with the NJ Appellate Division, and I could not believe that Mr. Martin would not know that you cannot file "opinions" in a legal brief. Only facts are allowed. I did not send the attachments originally as at the time my intent was simply to provide a factual background, not to overwhelm Mr. Martin until I knew his intent. My response was to send several of the indisputable "factual" documents that are public record as part of the legal case. I will enclose the E-mails.
Afterwards reporter Mike Mathis emailed me. What disturbed me is that from over 12 years as a very active law enforcement officer in Burlington County, one thing I know is when someone is trying to be disingenuous. Mr. Mathis and I met before. He was shown the facts then. He chose to not do the story for reasons known only to him. Instead, he offers me a wild goose chase that he already knows the conclusion. He knows, from my previous attempts, that any complaints I try to sign will be squashed illegally, one way or another. So in reply, I challenged Mr. Mathis to accompany me as I try his request and follow me as I go to the various legal courts to sign complaints since that is his only focus. This way he can do the story from the ground up, and first hand! Does it get any better? What reporter wouldn't want the chance to first hand accounts of substantial corruption? Again, I will attach the relevant E-mails. To date, Mr. Mathis has failed to respond. Indeed, the newest victim told me that while speaking to Mr. Mathis about his matter, Mr. Mathis expressed his anger at me for "having gone over his head" and contacting the home office. I think this makes my case. Something is just wrong here. This story is too easily verified for that to be an issue and the facts that were provided are irrefutable. So the question is, and should be, why is the Burlington County Times not doing the story?

As I told Mr. Martin, I intend to list the Burlington County Times on my "Hall of Shame" page on my website: www.southjerseyjustice.com which I am in the process of completing. I advise you of this not as a threat, but simply as a fact since this seems to be the only way to tell the story and bring attention to stop this rampant corruption.
There is a quote that I would like to think won't apply this once:

"Sometimes when people read the newspaper, they forget and
think that they are reading the news."

The story is newsworthy, it deserves and needs to be told properly and my hometown paper should tell it. Thank you in advance for your time. I hope to hear from you in the near future.
Sincerely,

Dale M. Baranoski

I strongly ask you contact USAO Chris Christie and demand he take action. To date, he refuses to do so. Perhaps now that he has dropped out of the Governor's race, he is less worried about who he might offend and will do his job. The Attorney General P. Harvey is useless and a waste of time to write, since his agency is involved.

January 17, 2004

U.S. Attorney Christopher J. Christie
Peter Rodino Federal Bldg. Suite 700
970 Broad St
Newark 07102

FAX (973)645-2702

Dear Mr. Christie:

I have written to you several times previously to request that your Office do that which it is legally required and to adhere to its primary goal – the legal protection and enforcement of constitutional safeguards for everyone, but especially victims of crime by those acting under the color of law. As a highly knowledgeable and trained person in both law and law enforcement, I am fully aware of the federal statues that are applicable and that have been violated. The more glaring violations involve:

Unlawful entry to private homes under false pretenses or pursuant to falsely obtained search warrants (falsesworn search warrant affidavits)

Unlawful search and seizures

False Arrest

False imprisonment

Tampering with evidence

Criminal interference with Federal lawsuit

Tampering with witnesses involved in both Federal and State action

Suborning perjury

I am writing to you now to provide you with one final opportunity to that which you are legally, morally and ethically required to do. I am confident that you will either ignore this letter, or offer some unfounded excuse why you are failing to address the problems and the crime exposed in my previous correspondence. In that case, I am informing you that if you fail to act and come to the aid of myself, a documented crime victim by those who have acted under the color of law, and to the aid of the other victims I have identified, then you will leave me no choice but to attempt to force you to act in accordance with Federal statutory law and I will file a Writ of Mandamus in Federal Court.

Additionally, I will also do my best to ensure that the media is made aware of my action, as well as your previous assertion that you will fight crime in the Southern New Jersey area, even if it is political in nature, or in the cases presented to you, involve criminal corruption within the law enforcement community that perverts the administration of law and intentionally targets the innocent; both law enforcement and civilian.

It is a frightening experience, to be a veteran law enforcement officer, and to be stripped of the most basic constitutional safeguards and protections. But what compounds the suffering is when those entrusted and empowered to take action against the transgressors, such as your Office, refuses to do so, or in the case of the State Attorney General's Office, covers up the corruption. And now, as I predicted, not only have the accused parties continued their rampant disregard for the law, they have now targeted a new victim, yet another law enforcement officer.

Mr. Christie, the criminal conduct and deprivation of civil rights, which includes blatant violation of Federal statues, is irrefutable. I've done my homework and can cite the Federal statues for you. Your Office is under legal obligation to take an active role against the identified accused parties before more victims are created. Your Office should not refuse to prosecute these crimes because of who the accused parties are or what affiliation they may have. It should be done because it is the just and proper response to those who would abuse the public trust given to them by virtue of their public positions.

In anticipation that you may respond and provide the standard form response to "seek legal counsel" and pursue "civil remedies" to address these violations, please be advised that this has been attempted. In 1997, after the New Jersey Attorney General's Office refused to take action when I was first unlawfully targeted, I filed a Federal complaint. Incredulously, the accused individuals named in that suit did not retreat, and in fact, committed further and more blatant criminal conduct with one of the goals surely being to derail the Federal complaint. To compound matters, another victim had filed his own civil suit in 1997. Yet, despite TWO civil actions having been filed against this corrupt regime, the accused continued to increase their criminal acts in both frequency and severity.

Terrorism of a domestic sort is alive and flourishing in New Jersey because people in positions that could do something about it refuse to.

Related story:

LA police corruption victim speaks out after $6.2 million award
LAURA WIDES, Associated Press

LINK

MONTEBELLO, Calif. - Javier Ovando still uses a wheelchair, has bullet fragments lodged in his hip and a scar above his heart from being shot by corrupt police officers in 1996.

None of that could keep him from smiling Friday, two days after a jury ruled his public defender was negligent in allowing a jury to falsely convict Ovando of assaulting the rogue police officers who nearly killed him.

"It's a good feeling," Ovando said as he ran his hand through the curly hair on his head that hides still another bullet scar.

"The trial was hard. Mentally, I was going back to the hospital, to jail ... but it was a release," he told The Associated Press. "I got to tell my story."

Ovando, then a 19-year-old gang member, was shot and paralyzed by two officers who then planted a gun on him and accused him of assault. He was convicted and sentenced to 23 years in prison, where he spent more than two years until the truth finally came out.

The jurors who ruled Ovando's attorney was negligent also awarded him $6.2 million in damages.

But Wednesday's verdict wasn't just about money. Ovando had already been awarded $15 million by the city of Los Angeles in an out-of-court settlement.

This time he got not only the award but also the jury's vote of confidence.

"This time they believed me," he said.

Ovando's conviction was the most infamous of more than 100 tainted by police misconduct that came to light in 1999 when a former officer seeking a lighter sentence for stealing cocaine from an evidence room blew the whistle on the city's so-called Rampart police corruption scandal.

The scandal, in which it was revealed that officers working in the city's rough Rampart neighborhood near downtown beat and framed innocent people, resulted in scores of criminal convictions being reversed. The city has paid out more than $70 million in settlements to victims.

Although Ovando was quickly released from prison, he said he was still filled with rage over what had happened to him and the fact he'd been convicted of attacking the officers. The shy young man, who remained in constant pain from the shooting, barely spoke in public and when he did his words came haltingly.

"I had the money. I was fine, I had everything, but you know I still had this anger and I'm still in a wheelchair," he said Friday as he looked down at his hands, which still shake slightly as a result of the shooting.

His lawyer said Wednesday's ruling gives hope to others wrongly accused who don't have the money to hire private attorneys.

"The public defender's office will be put on notice that they're going to be held to a standard, that even if their clients don't have money they have to do a reasonably competent job of defending them," said attorney Gregory Moreno.

Chief Deputy Public Defender Robert Kalunian said his office will meet with county lawyers next week to decide whether to appeal. He supported Tamar Toister, the attorney who defended Ovando.

"We still believe that Ms. Toister did everything she could, did not commit malpractice and was not negligent," Kalunian said.

Wednesday's verdict represents only one piece in the puzzle that is Ovando's search for peace.

In prison, the Honduran immigrant, who came to Los Angeles alone at 15, learned English and began drawing.

After his release, he began therapy and art classes and is working toward his GED degree. He says he got $9 million from his first settlement after lawyers' fees, enough to live on.

"But I want to paint, and if I can keep with school, get a job. You've got to do something," he said.

The dark memories of his time behind bars still sometimes keep sleep at bay, and his case has isolated him from those he knew and those he meets.

His first night in jail, Ovando recalled, he fell off his narrow bed and couldn't pull himself back up. He slept on the cold floor, his bullet wounds pressed against the concrete.

In the morning, the prisoners were called to line up outside their cells for breakfast. Ovando began yelling, terrified no one would notice him.

Two prisoners eventually lifted the mortified Ovando, pulled on his pants and eased him into his wheelchair.

After his release from prison, he returned to his old neighborhood where, after his settlement, he said he was no longer sure who was his friend and who was after his money. A drug arrest soon after his release from prison led to a stint in rehab and put an end to that part of his life.

He has an 8-year-old daughter who was born while he was in prison, but she's only been to her father's home a few times.

He eventually moved to a new neighborhood where he began telling people at the gym where he works out that he was hurt in a car accident. Even his art teacher doesn't know what really happened.

Reminded that now that he's back in the news his teacher may soon learn of his past, Ovando looked worried.

"Maybe I'll got to a different school," he said with a sigh.

But a moment later, as the conversation returned to the subject of Wednesday's verdict, Ovando's broad smile returned.

Police Corruption: Introduction
In the fall of 1999, Rafael Perez, a police officer in the Los Angeles Police Department's crime- and gangster-ridden Rampart Division, was arrested for stealing three kilos of cocaine that had been confiscated as evidence during an undercover drug deal. In exchange for a lighter sentence, Perez, who was assigned to the elite antigang unit known as CRASH (Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums), offered to tell investigators about other crimes he and his fellow Rampart officers had committed. The highest-profile crime Perez admitted to was shooting Javier Francisco Ovando in October 1996 and subsequently planting a gun on him to frame him for attacking him and his partner. Ovando, who was paralyzed by the shooting, was sentenced to twenty-three years in prison, but was released in September 1999 after Perez's confession. Perez also told investigators that he helped cover up two other unjustified shootings by Rampart police officers, including one incident in which the victim bled to death while police officers delayed an ambulance's arrival while they conferred on their cover story. He implicated more than seventy officers in such acts of misconduct as drug dealing, planting evidence, making false arrests, and covering up crimes they had themselves committed.

During more than fifty hours of interviews with authorities, Perez discussed how he went from a hard-charging rookie to a cynical and corrupt police officer. The first time he stole money from a suspect was in 1997 when he and his partner, Nino Durden, arrested a drug dealer. They confiscated a pound of cocaine and a pager from the dealer but kept them instead of turning them in. When the dealer's pager went off, they arranged a meeting to sell the drug, initially intending to arrest the drug buyer. According to Perez, when they arrived at the meeting site Durden said, "'Screw it, let's just sell to him.' And I completely agreed." Perez and Durden made two other sales from the confiscated cocaine and netted about $10,000. After that incident, Perez said he and Durden broke the law almost as frequently as they enforced it.

Other officers beside Perez and Durden were also actively involved in acts of misconduct and corruption. Perez told investigators about officers who crashed a party attended by gang members. One officer had the gang members drop to their knees while he walked behind them and told them what fabricated crimes he was going to charge them with. Another officer repeatedly shot a suspect with a bean bag gun for sport. One police officer rounded up a gang member he believed was responsible for slashing the tires of his patrol car, stripped him naked, and dropped him in enemy gang territory. Perez told authorities that of the fifteen officers in his squad, thirteen framed innocent people for crimes they did not commit.

Following Perez's confession, the Los Angeles district attorney's office had to reexamine thousands of cases in which the implicated officers were involved to determine if the suspects had been unfairly accused and convicted. According to Perez, "90 percent of the officers who work CRASH, and not just Rampart CRASH, falsify a lot of information. . . . It hurts me to say it, but there's a lot of crooked stuff going on in the LAPD." As a result of his allegations, more than one hundred convictions had been overturned by the end of 2001, and Los Angeles officials are expecting to pay out millions of dollars to settle lawsuits against the city.

Bernard C. Parks, chief of police for the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), established a Board of Inquiry to investigate Perez's allegations. According to the Board of Inquiry's March 2000 report into the Rampart area corruption scandal, there were many breakdowns in the organization that allowed the police corruption to grow and spread. Chief among the report's findings was evidence of mediocre performance by police officers throughout Los Angeles. The report claims that officers with integrity and those who were just coasting by saw that the offenses of mediocre officers were not dealt with, so they also began to allow their standards to decline. According to the report, "Rather than challenging our people to do their best, too many of our leaders are allowing mediocre performance, and, in some cases, even making excuses for it." The authors continue, "Many of these officers allowed their personal integrity to erode and their activities certainly had a contagion effect on some of those around them." Other faults that contributed to the corruption scandal were inadequate screening of new recruits and a failure to supervise officers in the field and monitor their misconduct. However, the board was insistent on pointing out that


the Rampart corruption incident occurred because a few individuals decided to engage in blatant misconduct and, in some cases, criminal behavior. Published assertions by . . . Rafael Perez that the pressure to produce arrests caused him to become corrupt, simply ignores the fact that he was convicted of stealing narcotics so he could sell them and live the life style of a "high roller." Even the finest corruption prevention system will not stop an individual from committing a crime if he or she has the will to do so.
In addition, the Board of Inquiry found several problems in the recruiting, hiring, and training of police officers, as well as inattentive and ineffective managers and supervisors that contributed to an atmosphere conducive to police corruption.

The board discovered that four of the officers under investigation for corruption had a criminal record, problems with managing their finances, and a history of violent behavior and involvement in drugs. It also found that assignments to the Rampart Division were based on a sponsorship system in which new officers were nominated for inclusion rather than by a promotion system that awarded ability or experience. The report discussed the fact that few citizen complaints against Rampart officers were taken seriously by police supervisors and that management failed to recognize and correct officer misconduct. It concluded that many of the problems it found during its inquiry were due to the fact that police-from upper management down to patrol officers-were "failing to do their jobs with a high level of consistency and integrity."

Shortly after the Board of Inquiry released its report about the cor- ruption scandal at Rampart, Erwin Chemerinsky, a renowned legal ethicist and professor of public interest law at the University of Southern California, prepared an analysis of the report. He begins by arguing that the corruption scandal is

the worst scandal in the history of Los Angeles. Police officers framed innocent individuals by planting evidence and committing perjury to gain convictions. Nothing is more inimical to the rule of law than police officers, sworn to uphold the law, flouting it and using their authority to convict innocent people. Innocent men and women pleaded guilty to crimes they did not commit and were convicted by juries because of the fabricated cases against them.
He adds, "Any analysis of the Rampart scandal must begin with an appreciation of the heinous nature of what the officers did. This is conduct associated with the most repressive dictators and police states." In Chemerinsky's opinion, the Board of Inquiry minimized the seriousness and extent of the corruption and the impact it had on the community. In addition, he contends that the Board of Inquiry did not discuss the notorious "Code of Silence" in which police officers refuse to discuss or turn a blind eye to their colleagues' misconduct.

The issues raised by the Board of Inquiry and by Chemerinsky are common to all other police corruption incidents. Poor hiring practices and inadequate training and supervision are perhaps the biggest contributors to police corruption. In Police Corruption: At Issue, the authors examine these issues in more detail and also discuss how corruption can be prevented or detected once it occurs.

Frank L. Perry, the former chief of the Ethics Unit, Office of Professional Responsibility, at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia, is head of the FBI agency in Raleigh, North Carolina.

Summary: Most studies of police corruption are beginning to reject the "bad apple" theory-that corrupt officers are only a few rotten apples in the barrel. Instead, they are beginning to examine the "barrel"- the individual police department-for signs that corruption is allowed, encouraged, or ignored. Police departments must ensure that only fully qualified applicants who demonstrate integrity are selected to become police officers. To prevent corruption, police officers should be frequently assigned new roles or to different departments, especially those officers who work in positions that are more prone to corruption, such as vice squads or drug units. In addition, police officers should be held to a higher standard of conduct than ordinary citizens, and the standards should be raised as an officer progresses through the ranks.
In the last two decades, research and commentary regarding the causes and effects of law enforcement corruption have intensified and diversified. Efforts in Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and the United States have effectively identified symptoms and remedies in those countries, as emerging democracies in Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Pacific Rim face the more immediate and stark realities of self-governance and the police role. Comparative reviews of problems and best practices, as well as academic research, suggest that corruption follows certain predictable routes and that precursory signs occur prior to any actual quid pro quo corrupt activity.

Three organizational failures can foster a resentful, cynical, and demoralized work force leading to individual and collective acts of corruption. These failures are: little or ineffective discipline and deselection of trainees (a commitment to fairly but firmly graduate only those individuals who truly demonstrate performance and integrity standards); igno- rance of the nature and effects of the goal-gradient phenomenon (the farther away individuals remain from their goal, the less the tendency to remain passionately interested in its attainment); and the allowance of a double standard within the organization, thereby decreasing moral accountability as professional responsibility increases. All of these factors represent instances of what sociologists have referred to for many years as the "broken window theory"-if enough broken windows in a neighborhood go unattended, the neighborhood falls into a moral and material malaise. Law enforcement applications of this theory are addressed rarely.

Understanding corruption
Corruption can include an abuse of position, although not all abuses of position constitute corrupt acts. Committing a criminal act under color of law represents one example of corruption, while using one's law enforcement position for a de minimus, or insignificant, private gain may not necessarily rise to what reasonable persons will call a corrupt act, though it may be corrupting. All self-interested or potentially corrupt acts are not completely corrupt. In fact, these acts can constitute police deviance, which best captures the nature of the precursory signs of corruption, as opposed to actual corruption.

Precursory signs, or instances of police deviance, may be agencyspecific, or generic and found in law enforcement as a profession. Unprofessional on- and off-duty misconduct, isolated instances of misuse of position, improper relationships with informants or criminals, sexual harassment, disparaging racial or sexual comments, embellished/falsified reporting, time and attendance abuse, insubordination, nepotism, cronyism, and noncriminal unauthorized disclosure of information all represent precursory signs of police deviance that inspection and internal affairs components must monitor. When agencies determine a trend of increasing frequency and egregiousness of such deviance, they must take steps before classic or quid pro quo corruption occurs. An organization with an increase in such deviance becomes a "rotten barrel," even without completely "rotten apples."

Literature on the rotten-barrel concept has become more sophisticated. One study, [quoting former New York Police Commissioner Patrick Murphy,] surmises that most of the major inquiries into police corruption reject the "bad-apple" theory: "The rotten-apple theory won't work any longer. Corrupt police officers are not natural-born criminals, nor morally wicked men, constitutionally different from their honest colleagues. The task of corruption control is to examine the barrel, not just the apples, the organization, not just the individual in it, because corrupt police are made, not born."

How, then, can agencies examine the barrel? They must analyze the increasing frequency and egregiousness of precursory signs, then assess their department's training. Agencies must not treat deselection expressly or implicitly as a negative or detrimental policy. No trainee has a right to become a law enforcement officer, although all qualified persons have an equal right to compete for such an assignment. Personnel, applicant, or recruitment officers within police agencies cannot predict who will meet all suitability and trustworthiness standards prior to the training setting. Therefore, the training components must make this determination with an overriding focus on the agency's mission, image, and efficacy, while maintaining a respect-of-persons principle. This means deselection-a commitment to fairly but firmly graduate only those who truly demonstrate performance and integrity standards. Organizational laziness in this regard is detrimental to the agency and to the community it protects. Once immersed in the weighty discretion and low visibility of law enforcement culture, those who do not meet minimal suitability and trustworthiness standards will contribute invariably to the frequency of the precursory signs. The practical conclusion drawn from recent research [by John Kleinig] is that, "in order to distance oneself morally from serious corruption, it is important not to engage in any corruption, albeit corruption of an apparently trivial kind. . . . Once a certain practice is accepted, people are likely to go on to accept other practices that are increasingly unacceptable."

Failure to impartially deselect trainees based upon suitability and trustworthiness standards eventually determines the organizational grade of the infamous slippery slope. The higher the performance and integrity standards for successful completion of the training program, the greater the angle from actual performance and moral peak to potential failure. Metaphorically, the organizational culture will help prevent individual slide because the ethical and performance slope is so steep and the incremental slide more obvious and preventive. Conversely, the more gradual the slope, the less the perception of moral and administrative slide.

Additionally, law enforcement agencies must understand and confront the goal-gradient phenomenon, a facet of human behavior most relevant to law enforcement work and culture. In general, the closer individuals get to their goal, the faster they run (a race), the harder they try (a career), or the more interest they show (working late the night before a vacation). Applied to law enforcement, the goal-gradient phenomenon suggests that the midpoint in an officer's career can present a danger zone for malaise, resentment, cynicism, or just plain boredom. Such attitudes fuel precursory corruption or police deviance, if not actual corruption. Most professionals in any field of endeavor can deal with and overcome the "too late to quit and too early to retire" syndrome successfully, but when burdened with the rigors of the very nature of law enforcement, such as high discretion, low visibility, and criminal element interaction, and weighed down further by an agency culture of poor recruitment, ineffective training, and inept internal controls, then the goal-gradient phenomenon can become fatal-to a career and to an organization.

Preventing corruption
How can law enforcement agencies counter this tendency of human nature? First, agencies should consider frequent assignment moves, espe- cially from and to the areas of policing more prone to corruption. Geographical and intradivisional reassignments prevent stagnation, broaden experience, and preempt lasting effects of deleterious associations-albeit perhaps at the expense of deepening expertise in a single area.

Second, agencies should "feed the eagles." One police corruption investigation, [discussed by Tim Newburn,] "perhaps best known for its distinction between 'grass eaters' and 'meat eaters,' also included a third category: the 'birds.' The birds were the officers who flew above the corruption, seeking safety in the safe and rarified air of administrative positions." The birds fly above corruption or deviance, but sometimes they also confront it. Certainly, these birds who aspire for management ranks can, to further the analogy, become "eagles." The eagle confronts corruption, soars to perform duties in the most noble fashion possible, and, thereby, raises the organization's dignity and effectiveness. Thus, agencies should select, nurture, and promote individuals who demonstrate these attributes early.

Efforts to counter the goal gradient should include positive reinforcement. Individuals relish fair and honest praise, commendation, and recognition. Agencies should do the same for all of their employees as long as flattery, political gain, or gratuitous self-promotion are not intended. True professionals respect each other, and the goal gradient simply will not take hold where a culture of support, commonality, respect of persons, and appreciation of performance exists.

Third, the double standard must die. [According to Edwin J. Delattre,] "Those who serve the public must be held to a higher standard of honesty and care for the public good than the general citizenry. . . . A higher standard is not a double standard. Persons accepting positions of public trust take on new obligations and are free not to accept them if they do not want to live up to the higher standard." Beginning a career in law enforcement- perhaps the most entrusting and powerful service for the public good-entails a higher standard of conduct and calling for the trainee. Certainly, this reasoning should continue up through and to the command or executive management level. Who could argue that with increasing rank within a law enforcement agency comes either diminished or even the same obligation to the public good as that of a support employee, patrol officer, or street investigator? If the premise that individuals accepting positions of public trust take on new obligations, then it follows that the higher the position, the higher the standard. Birds must fly, but they also must land. Noble eagles do not hide in the underbrush of hidden agendas or attempts at cover-up and cronyism. Administrators must hold law enforcement eagles more accountable for their actions because they see more, know more, have more visibility, receive more pay, and must make responsible decisions for the sake of the agency's mission and, correspondingly, for the public good. Law enforcement agencies most resistant to corruption remove temptation, increase the fear of detection, and emphasize managerial responsibility. Moreover, leadership on the part of these agencies' senior officers consists of their willingness, [as M. Punch writes,] to "state explicitly and openly that . . . they will personally serve as role models for integrity."

The benefits of preventing corruption lie in stark contrast to the contempt, cynicism, and resentment generated within an organization-and for an organization as viewed by the taxpayer-when it winks at misconduct, whether precursory, deviant, corrupt, or criminal, on the part of management. As some researchers emphasize, increasing managerial moral responsibility and accountability builds institutional pride. It dies when a policy creates a double standard or when favoritism, cronyism, or career aggrandizement develop it.

Therefore, internal controls must remain firm, fair, and fast, as well as forthright. Even an appearance of management protecting its own in substantiated cases of misconduct will not only cause forfeiture of an agency's internal police powers, but will ruin the agency itself.

Avoiding deselection, ignoring the goal gradient, and promoting or permitting a double standard of internal controls can result in corruption in law enforcement agencies. Internal affairs and ethics components within law enforcement agencies, therefore, must remain, [according to Newburn,] "vigilant and skeptical." Neither attribute is akin to cynicism or arrogance, and neither vigilance nor skepticism need be born of zealots. Monitoring human conduct within law enforcement agencies-themselves designed to monitor human conduct writ large-must be done with uncompromising care for human dignity, while carefully maintaining and enhancing the mission of the agency.

From "Repairing Broken Windows: Preventing Corruption Within Our Ranks," by Frank L. Perry, FBI Bulletin, February 2001.